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BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP AND THE ALIEN
CITIZEN
Mae M. Ngai*
The alien citizen is an American citizen by virtue of her birth in the
United States but whose citizenship is suspect, if not denied, on account of
the racialized identity of her immigrant ancestry. In this construction, the
foreignness of non-European peoples is deemed unalterable, making
nationality a kind of racial trait. Alienage, then, becomes a permanent
condition, passed from generation to generation, adhering even to the
native-born citizen.
Qualifiers like "accidental" citizen,1 "presumed"
2
citizen, or even "terrorist" citizen 3 have been used in political and legal
arguments to denigrate, compromise, and nullify the U.S. citizenship of
"unassimilable" Chinese, "enemy-race" Japanese, Mexican "illegal aliens,"
.aA X4 -1,;otreit."
1.1

-U
1 .-O-...

...

...

The idea of alien citizenship has had widespread social currency. Its
influence derives from the idea that non-European peoples are racially or, in
modern expression, culturally backward, that they are unable or unwilling
to assimilate, and that they are unfit for liberal citizenship. Racism thus
creates a problem of misrecognition for the citizen of Asian or Latino
descent and, more recently, the citizen who appears to be "Middle Eastern,
4
Arab, or Muslim."
In addition to the cultural dimensions of citizenship, 5 alien citizenship
has been expressed in law and official policy. This suggests not only that
alien citizenship is more than a racial metaphor, but also that there is an
important relationship between juridical and cultural citizenship that
warrants greater investigation. Leti Volpp, for example, has suggested that
whereas common juridical status may be the grounds for a culture of
solidarity among citizens, the converse may just as well be true-that racial

* Professor of History, Columbia University.

1. See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 731 (1898) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
2. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. See, e.g., Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 728 (2d Cir. 2003) (Wesley, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
4. See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1575, 1580-83

(2002).
5. See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 447
(2000); Volpp, supra note 4; see also Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American

History and the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage,53 UCLA L. Rev. 405 (2005).
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difference and exclusion from social or cultural belonging may lead to
6
differential legal treatment of citizens.
CITIZENSHIP NULLIFICATION

As a legal matter, alien citizenship involves the nullification of the rights
of citizenship-from the right to be territorially present to the range of civil
rights and liberties-without formal revocation of citizenship status. The
repatriation (territorial removal) of 400,000 ethnic Mexicans during the
Great Depression, half of them U.S. citizens, 7 and the internment of
120,000 people of Japanese descent during World War II, two-thirds of
them U.S. citizens, 8 may be considered instances of official alien
citizenship.
In both cases, alien citizenship derived directly from the legal exclusion
of the citizens' immigrant forebears from the normative path of
immigration and naturalization (i.e., legal entry to settlement to citizenship).
The advent of a regime of immigration restriction in the 1920s created
unauthorized entry as a mass phenomenon and legal problem, and Mexicans
comprised the single largest group of undocumented migrants by the late
1920s. The real and imagined association of Mexicans with "illegal aliens,"
along with the creation of a landless, migratory agricultural proletariat and
the extension of Jim Crow segregation to Mexicans in the southwest,
stripped all ethnic Mexicans (regardless of legal status) of legitimate
belonging and impelled the construction of Mexican American alien
9
citizens.
Japanese Americans, like other Asian Americans, were excluded from
both immigration and naturalized citizenship on grounds of "racial
unassimilability" from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth
century.' 0 Asiatic exclusion was the most complete race-based legal
6. See generally Volpp, supra note 4.
7. See generally Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great
Depression: Repatriation Pressures 1929-39 (1974); Raymond Rodriguez & Francisco E.
Balderrama, Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in the 1930s (1995).
8. See Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modem
America 175-201 (2004); Michi Weglyn, Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's
Concentration Camps (1976).
9. See Ngai, supra note 8, at 56-90, 127-66.
10. See Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952)
(excluding from immigration all persons ineligible for citizenship); Immigration Act of
1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952) (creating barred Asiatic zone from Afghanistan to
the Pacific); Chinese Exclusion Act of 1904, ch. 1630, 33 Stat. 428 (repealed 1943) (barring
all Chinese laborers); Chinese Exclusion Act of 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (repealed 1943);
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943); Page Act of 1875, ch.
141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974) (barring Mongolian prostitutes); Gentlemen's Agreement,
U.S.-Japan, 1908, acknowledged in Annual Report of Commissioner-General of Immigration
for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30 1908, 125-27 (limiting visas to Japanese laborers)
(effectively ended by Immigration Act of 1924); United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923)
(upholding exclusion of Asians from naturalization); Ozawa v. U.S., 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
Exclusion was gradually eliminated between 1943 and 1952. See Chinese Repealer, ch. 344,
57 Stat. 600, 1194 (1943); Luce-Celler Act, ch. 534, 60 Stat. 416 (codified in scattered
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exclusion from citizenship since Dred Scott' 1 and was instituted,
significantly, in the 1880s, after the Fourteenth Amendment nullified Dred
Scott. The legal and cultural force of Asiatic exclusion was so powerful
that the idea of permanent foreignness continued to adhere to native-born
Asian American citizens even decades after the exclusion laws were
repealed, a racism that literary scholar Lisa Lowe describes as the "material
trace of history."12
Alien citizenship is a defining legal characteristic of the racial formation
of Asian and Latino ethnic groups. African Americans also have been
constructed as "foreign," as evident in early nineteenth century colonization
movements to "return" free blacks to Africa. 13 But after passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the birthright citizenship of African Americans
became indisputable, even if demoted to "second class." Indeed, opponents
of citizenship for Chinese and other Asians often used African American
citizenship as a negative example of the harm that conferring citizenship on
14
unassimilated, backward races brought to the institution.
The concept of alien citizenship is, of course, inherently contradictory.
Asian Americans' and MexLi An ericans' stogge
against rn inl
exclusion and subordination have always included efforts to secure the full
rights of citizenship, which is to say, to eliminate the "alien" from "alien
citizen." But, from the other direction, there also have been efforts to
resolve the contradiction by formally denying territorial birthright
citizenship to certain groups, that is, to eliminate the "citizen" from the
"alien citizen," to render her wholly alien. These efforts are diverse but
invariably involve challenges to the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
15
the State wherein they reside."'

sections of 8 and 9 U.S.C.) (amending Nationality Act of 1940 to repeal Indian and Filipino
exclusion from citizenship); McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (2000) (repealing all racial barriers to naturalization).
11. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
12. Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics 26 (1996); see
also Ling-Chi Wang, The John Huang Controversy-A Wake-up Call for Asian-American
Activists,
JINN
Magazine,
Oct.
23,
1996,
http://www.pacificnews.org/jinn/stories/2.22/961023-lobby.html; Ling-Chi Wang, China
Spy Scandal Taps Reservoir of Racism, JINN Magazine, Mar. 18, 1999,
http://www.pacificnews.org/jinn/stories/5.06/990318-china.html.
13. African colonization and repatriation movements have been promoted by both EuroAmericans wishing to rid the United States of black people and African Americans seeking
freedom via a return to their origins. See, e.g., 10 Anti-Black Thought, 1863-1925: The
American Colonization Society and Emigration (John David Smith ed., 1993); Claude A.
Clegg III, The Price of Liberty: African Americans and the Making of Liberia (2004); see
also Kunal M. Parker, Making Blacks Foreigners: The Legal Construction of Former Slaves
in Post-RevolutionaryMassachusetts,2001 Utah L. Rev. 75.
14. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
15. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Since its ruling in United States v. Wong Kim Ark in 1898,16 the Supreme
Court has upheld the declaratory force of that clause. Commentators have
generally agreed that the weight of precedent is considerable and have
doubted that it can be overcome. 1 7 Nonetheless, contemporary concerns
about illegal immigration and terrorism have renewed efforts to strip
birthright citizenship from groups deemed unworthy of it. The Citizenship
Reform Act of 2005, introduced by Republican Representative Nathan Deal
of Georgia, would "deny automatic citizenship at birth to children born in
the United States to parents who are not citizens or permanent resident
aliens," including children born "out of wedlock" to a mother who is not a
citizen or permanent resident. 18 John C. Eastman, a leading advocate for
exempting children of illegal aliens from birthright citizenship has argued
that a reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment became urgent "[i]n
the wake of 9/1 ."19
Controversy over the meaning of citizenship also has erupted in England,
where British-born citizens of South Asian descent have been implicated in
terrorist acts and plots. 20 In recent years, Ireland (2004)21 and New Zealand
(2005)22 have amended their citizenship laws to confer citizenship at birth
only to children with at least one citizen or permanent-resident parent.

16. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
17. See, e.g., Stephen Dinan, GOP Mulls Ending Birthright Citizenship, Wash. Times,
Nov. 4, 2005, at Al; The Stupid Shall be Punished:
"Birthright Citizenship,"
http://bubbleheads.blogspot.com/2006/10/birthright-citizenship.html (Oct. 21, 2006, 23:15
EST). But, as noted by Michele Waslin of the National Council of La Raza, "This was
always seen in the past as some extreme, wacko proposal that never goes anywhere ....But
these so-called wacko proposals are becoming more and more mainstream-it's becoming
more acceptable to have a discussion about it." 'BirthrightCitizenship' Debate Set to Begin,
MSNBC.com, Dec. 26, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10609068/.
18. H.R. 698, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005). "Out of wedlock" specifically includes "common
law marriages." The bill had eighty-seven cosponsors. See Information on H.R. 698,
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d 109:698:./list/bss/dl O9HR.lst::ITOM:/bss/109se
arch.htmll (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
19. Hearing on Dual Citizenship, BirthrightCitizenship, and the Meaning of Sovereignty
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 57-72 (2005) (statement of John C. Eastman, Professor of Law);
John C. Eastman, Politics and the Court: Did the Supreme Court Really Move Left Because
of Embarrassment over Bush v. Gore? 94 Geo. L.J. 1475, 1484 (2006). Constitutional
amendments limiting citizenship to children of citizens and legal residents also were
introduced into the Congress in 1993 and 1995. See H.R.J. Res. 56, 104th Cong. (1995);
H.R.J. Res. 129, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 117, 103d Congress (1993). Bills
amending immigration and nationality laws to the same effect were introduced in 1995. See
H.R. 1363, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 705, 104th Cong. (1995).
20. See Serge F. Kovaleski, Young Muslims in Britain Hear Competing Appeals, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 29, 2006, at A3.
21. See Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 2004 (Act No. 38/2004) (Ir.) (limiting
grant of citizenship by jus soli to persons with at least one parent who is an Irish or British
citizen or who meets certain criteria of residence or right of residence).
22. See Citizenship Amendment Act 2005, 2005 S.N.Z. No. 43 (N.Z.) (limiting
territorial birthright citizenship to children with at least one New Zealand citizen or
permanent-resident parent).
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These developments warn us that access to citizenship, including birthright
citizenship in the United States, is not fixed but politically contingent.
THE CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE

In the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment established (or, more
precisely, made explicit for national citizenship that which had been the
case since the founding of the republic) the rule of jus soli, or citizenship
based on place of birth, a rule derived from the English common law. 23
The United States also has a tradition of jus sanguinus as it grants
citizenship to children born to U.S. citizens abroad (as long as they have
prior residence in the United States), but this is a statutory corollary to the
constitutional principle that assigns citizenship at birth by territory. 24
Opponents of territorial birthright citizenship argue in terms of history,
political theory, and textual interpretation. There has been much discussion
and debate on the question, especially since the publication of Peter Schuck
and Rogers Smith's Citizenship Without Consent in 1985, so I will only
summarize the debate here. 2 5 It is argued first that the English common law
ofjus soli, which aimed to ensure the allegiance of the monarch's subjects
in exchange for his protection, is a feudal remnant not compatible with
citizenship in a republic, which is (or should be) based on consent. 26 The

23. See Calvin's Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.), arguing that a person born in
Scotland after James I ascended the throne of England was a "natural-born subject" and as
such was entitled to inherit land in England. The ruling held that the king's sovereignty
residing in his corporeal body was part of the "divine law of nature" and thus greater than
the discrete political jurisdictions under his sovereignty. In seventeenth century England,
subjecthood was primarily a matter of allegiance as few benefits accrued to natural-born
subjects but these did include the right to inherit land and to sue in the king's courts. English
opponents of territorial birthright raised the specter of hordes of Scots acquiring property in
England. See Polly J. Price, NaturalLaw and BirthrightCitizenship in Calvin's Case (1608),
9 Yale J.L. & Human. 73, 95 (1997).
24. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2000). In cases of children born out of wedlock the law grants
citizenship by descent to those born to a citizen mother but not to those with a citizen father
unless additional requirements are met, including "clear and convincing" evidence of
biological parentage and a history of parental support. See id. § 1409. The policy,
presumably aimed at limiting citizenship claims by persons fathered by U.S. soldiers abroad,
has withstood gender-discrimination challenge. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
25. Peter H. Schuck & Rogers M. Smith, Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in
the American Polity (1985); cf Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of
Citizenship in U.S. History 308-10 (1997); Letter from Professor Rogers M. Smith to
Professor Gerald L. Neuman (July 9, 1987), in Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy
1308 (Stephen H. Legomsky ed., 4th ed. 2005). For critiques and more discussion, see
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 54
(1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Back to Dred Scott?, 24 San Diego L. Rev. 485 (1987) (book
review); David S. Schwartz, The Amorality of Consent, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 2143 (1986) (book
review).
26. Schuck & Smith, supra note 25, at 20-23. The same line of reasoning was at the
core of the argument made by the United States in the Wong Kim Ark case. See Brief of
Appellant, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (No. 904), in 14 Landmark
Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law 3
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
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second argument is that the Fourteenth Amendment's phrase, "subject to
the jurisdiction thereof' should not be interpreted as mere territorial
jurisdiction exempting only the children of foreign diplomats as the Court
ruled in Wong Kim Ark, but rather that "jurisdiction" should be interpreted
to mean political jurisdiction, which invokes the principle of consent.2 7 By
this reasoning, the children of illegal aliens and temporary foreign visitors
should not be citizens because their parents do not have the government's
permission for entry or, in the case of transients, for permanent residence.
Here, citizenship is seen as a kind of unjust enrichment, opportunistically
28
acquired.
The focus onjus soli as ascriptive elides the fact that both basic rules of
assigning citizenship at birth are ascriptive, whether by geography or by
descent (jus sanguinus after all means the rule of blood). No person has
control over the circumstances of her birth. Neither type of American birthcitizenship involves consent; moreover, there is no general "consent
requirement" upon reaching the age of majority (though draft registration
for males can be construed to be a kind of consent). 29 In contrast to the
native-born who hold passive citizenship, naturalized citizens and only
30
naturalized citizens give explicit consent to citizenship and its obligations.
Finally, to deny citizenship to a person based on her parents' illegal status is
to punish the child for the behavior of the parent, something we have long
31
recognized as morally and legally wrong.

27. Schuck & Smith, supra note 25, at 114; Eastman, supra note 19; John C. Eastman,
Claremont Inst.,
Citizens by Right, or by Consent?
(Jan. 2, 2006),
http://www.claremont.org/writings/060102eastman.html [hereinafter Eastman, Citizens]. A
related argument claims that the rule of descent avoids the problem of divided allegiances or
dual citizenship that can be created when two states vie for a person's allegiance, one by
territorial citizenship and one by descent. Id.
28. See Eastman, Citizens, supra note 27; see also Andrew Grossman, Birthright
Citizenship
as
Nationality
of
Convenience
(2004), . available
at
http://uniset.ca/naty/matemity/; Allan Wall, Anchor Babies (Apr. 26, 2001), reprinted at
http://www.americanpatrol.com/ANCHORBABIES/AnchorBabiesAllanWall.html.
29. Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith address this problem by proposing that the children
of U.S. citizens would acquire "provisional citizenship" at birth, which they can renounce at
majority and exercise their right of expatriation. Schuck & Smith, supra note 26, at 117.
Before majority they would have full protection as citizens as an extension of their parents'
citizenship rights. The option to renounce at majority, while an inclusive policy that would
not punish passive citizens and avoids the problem of determining positive requirements that
would invariably result in exclusions, does however seem to fall short of the consensual
ideal espoused by Schuck and Smith. Citizens already have the option to renounce and
expatriate.
30. Hence Bonnie Honig has argued that mass naturalization ceremonies are so
celebrated in American media because they renew the native-born citizen's faith in
consensual citizenship. See Bonnie Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner 75 (2001).
31. "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." Ezekiel 18:20. "[N]o child is
responsible for his birth .. " Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972); see Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977) (citing Weber, 406 U.S. at 175)
(considering the rights of illegitimate children); see also Oyama v. California., 332 U.S. 633
(1948) (ruling alien land laws unenforceable as applied in this case).
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Opponents of birthright citizenship generally do not argue directly in
terms of racial difference or racial exclusion. This may be because they are
not motivated by racism or, if they are, they know it is socially
unacceptable and legally dubious. But racial exclusion from citizenship has
a long history in the United States, one that has involved different
manipulations of territorial and descent-based citizenship. Even if racial
exclusion is not the intended result of eliminating birthright citizenship, it is
a certain outcome.
More important than the history of the English common law is the history
of American citizenship, which has always operated in both registers of soil
and blood. For Anglo- and other Euro-Americans, territorial birthright
citizenship has been the normative rule, not only because of the commonlaw tradition but in order to crisply define the citizenship of the new
republic and then to encourage immigration and settlement. It was,
arguably, not a legacy of feudal subjecthood but rather a progressive and
optimistic view of assimilation, of building the citizenry with the children
of immigrants, who would be more influenced by their experience in the
new republic than by the old-country habits and allegiances of their parentsIn contrast, the rule of descent historically has been used to exclude
people of color from citizenship. Dred Scott specified that the social
contract implicit in the Constitution was for and among white Euro32
Americans and did not intend to include slaves or free black persons.
Chinese and other Asians were excluded from naturalized citizenship as
racial unassimilables. Filipino, Puerto Rican, and other colonial subjects
were legally constructed as "noncitizen nationals," a status in-between alien
and citizen. 3 3 The subsequent statutory grant of citizenship to Puerto
34
Ricans in 1917 remains subject to congressional revocation.
At the same time, territorial birthright citizenship was used to consolidate
U.S. conquest over sovereign peoples. After the Mexican-American War,
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo stipulated that all Mexicans residing in the
conquered territory would become U.S. citizens within one year unless they
explicitly opted to retain Mexican citizenship; fewer than two thousand
people did so. 35 The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, which granted

32. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
33. After the Spanish-American War, Spain ceded to the United States the Philippines,
Puerto Rico, and Guam and "relinquished" its sovereignty over Cuba. Under provisions of
the Treaty of Paris, the "natives" of the territories became, without choice, noncitizen U.S.
nationals, with the further stipulation that the "civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants... shall be determined by Congress." Natives of Spain living in the territories at
the time of cession had the option to retain their Spanish nationality. Treaty of Peace
Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, U.S.-Spain, art. IX, Dec.
10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754 (commonly known as Treaty of Paris); see Dudley 0. McGovney,
Our Non-Citizen Nationals, Who Are They?, 22 Cal. L. Rev 593 (1934).
34. See Jones-Shafroth Act of Mar. 2, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 95 (1917); see generally Jos6 A.
Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire (1979).
35. See Ngai, supra note 8, at 50-51.
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Indians, should
territorial birthright citizenship to all Native American
36
properly be seen as a final blow to Indian sovereignty.
For the freed slaves, Chinese Americans, and other immigrant groups,
access to territorial birthright citizenship has been a measure of progress
against racial inequality and subordination. These groups have recognized
that citizenship is the most elemental condition for racial equality because
only citizenship guarantees the right to be territorially present and the right
to vote; in other words, it is the individual's foundational protection from
state authority. The Fourteenth Amendment aimed precisely to accomplish
that basic condition, to nullify Dred Scott's exclusion of black people from
citizenship.
During the regime of exclusion, Chinese Americans claimed birthright
citizenship as a toehold for their civil rights. For example, in the 1885
California case Tape v. Hurley,37 which challenged the exclusion of
Chinese from San Francisco's public schools, attorneys for the plaintiff
argued that exclusion violated state law and the Fourteenth Amendment,
"'especially so in this case, as the child is native-born."' 38 Throughout the
late nineteenth century, there was avid political opposition to recognizing
birthright citizenship for Chinese. The anti-Chinese nativists understood
that granting citizenship to the children of Chinese assured permanent
Chinese population, thereby undermining
settlement and an accretion of the
39
the very objectives of exclusion.
It was not until Wong Kim Ark in 1898 that the matter was settled. 40 In
his dissent, Chief Justice Melville Weston Fuller captured the widely held
view against native-born Chinese, asserting that the "imposition" of
citizenship on Chinese persons, whose birth on U.S. soil was an
"accident," contradicted Congress's intention to exclude Chinese. The
majority had no love of the Chinese, but the reasons for its ruling may be
first, to support the authority of the federal
deduced as twofold:
government over all persons under its jurisdiction during this period of
national consolidation; and second, to continue to support the immigration
of Europeans at a time of industrial development. Denying access to
territorial birthright citizenship to the children of aliens, the Court said,
would jeopardize "citizenship [for] thousands of persons of English, Scotch,
parentage, who have always been
Irish, German or other European
41
considered and treated as citizens."
36. See Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000)).
37. See Tape v. Hurley, 6 P. 129 (Cal. 1885).
38. Question of Admitting Chinese Pupils Causes a Debate, S.F. Daily Evening Bull.,
Oct. 4, 1884, at 1 (quoting Chinese Consul F. A. Bee).
39. See In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905 (1884); Citizenship and the Interpreter, S.F.
Daily Evening Bulletin, Nov. 10, 1884, at 2.
40. For an excellent discussion of the case, see Lucy E. Salyer, Wong Kim Ark: The
Contest over Birthright Citizenship, in Immigration Stories 51 (David A. Martin & Peter H.
Schuck eds., 2005).
41. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 694 (1898).
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But, because birthright citizenship existed alongside racial exclusions
from immigration and naturalization, there developed over the course of the
twentieth century the "alien citizen," with legal exclusions from admission
and naturalization serving as constant pressures against realization of full
citizenship rights of the native-born. Nevertheless the right to territorial
birthright citizenship was a marker of equality and inclusion.
The advantages and disadvantages of birthright citizenship cannot be
weighed solely in terms of a political theory of consent, but also must be
considered in light of the historical practices of American citizenship.
Those practices comprise a combination of soil and blood that have
included some and excluded others along the lines of racial difference.
Indeed, the racial history of citizenship reveals the principle of mutual
consent to be a fiction: The individual's consent to be governed carries far
less power than the state's ability to exclude. Seen from this angle,
birthright citizenship is a first-line defense of individual rights before the
42
arbitrary exercise of state authority.
The tradition of birthright citizenship as a strategy for immigrant
incorporation has been one that European immigrants always enjoyed.
Asian iiiunigrants fought to extend to all regardless of race and national
origin, and Mexican immigrants now fight to defend. In the words of one
immigrant advocate, birthright citizenship is a "tradition of really
43
integrating immigrants into our society in order to unify us as a nation."
In light of contemporary migration patterns, eliminating birthright
citizenship to children of illegal aliens would create a hereditary caste of
illegal aliens in our society, an extreme form of racial marginalization that
44
would impact Mexicans more than any other single ethno-racial group.
The consequences of eliminating birthright citizenship in the United
States might instructively be considered in light of recent developments in
Europe, where, faced with new populations arising from immigration, states
have amended their citizenship laws. 4 5 Thus, on the one hand, Germany,
which has historically practiced citizenship by descent, revised its laws in
2000 to grant birthright citizenship to German-born children of foreigners

42. See Bernadette Meyler, The Gestation of Birthright Citizenship, 1868-1898 States'
Rights, the Law of Nations, and Mutual Consent, 15 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 519, 551 (2001).
43. Bill Would Eliminate Birthright Citizenship, FOXNews.com, Nov. 27, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,176664,00.html.
44. Societal & Legal Issues Surrounding Children Born in the United States to illegal
Alien Parents, Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims and
Subcomm. on the Constitution, of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995)
(statement of Professor Gerald L. Neuman, Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law); Kevin R. Johnson,
Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in the Ivory Tower, and the
Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 525; Note, The Birthright
CitizenshipAmendment: A Threat to Equality, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1026 (1994).

45. Patrick Weil, Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality
Laws, in Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices 17 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff
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with long-time residence-a move prompted
by the growing population of
46
native-born noncitizens of Turkish descent.
On the other hand, Great Britain eliminated territorial birthright
citizenship in 1981, 47 after trying for decades to manage the status and
rights of immigrants from former colonies in the Caribbean and South Asia.
In 1986, Australia, experiencing a wave of immigration from Asia and the
Pacific, also restricted citizenship to children of citizens and permanent
residents. 48 In the last two years, Ireland 49 and New Zealand 50 have
followed suit. In each case, the changes were made at least partly, if not
primarily, in response to popular nativist sentiment against nonwhite
immigrants.
These postcolonial cases underscore the important historical relationship
between immigration and birthright citizenship. Although its origins lie in
the ascension of the King of Scotland to the English throne in 1603, in the
modem era of global migration, birthright citizenship has been a
mechanism for incorporating new immigrants, and its disavowal a
mechanism for exclusion.
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Nationality
Law
of
July
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1999),
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certain permits) are steep. According to one estimate, it would disqualify from birthright
citizenship the German-born children of two-thirds of the Turkish foreign-born residents in
Germany. Christiane Lemke, Citizenship Law in Germany: Traditional Concepts and
Pressures to Modernize in the Context of European Integration (2001) (out-of-print article,
on file with the Fordham Law Review).
47. See British Nationality Act, 1981, c. 61, §§ 1, 3.
48. See Australian Citizenship Amendment Act, 1986, c. 70, § 7.
49. See supra note 21.
50. See supra note 22.

